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Note
BEYOND TAXPAYERS’ SUITS: PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN THE
STATES
JOHN DIMANNO
In the 2007 Term, the United States Supreme Court reinforced its narrow
formulation of standing in public interest cases in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. The case was yet another in a long line of Supreme Court cases
that have denied public interest litigation on standing grounds in cases where a
litigant—as taxpayer and/or citizen—seeks to vindicate the public interest by
challenging an alleged government illegality. As a consequence, the restrictive
standing model in federal courts creates a number of circumstances in which a
potential constitutional violation by the government may go unchallenged.
Alternatively, many state courts have developed and successfully employed
alternative standing models that allow citizens or taxpayers to sue on behalf of the
public interest in cases involving issues of great constitutional importance. These
models—more liberal and discretionary than the federal model—demonstrate the
state courts’ commitment to ensuring that constitutional limitations on
governmental power are judicially enforced. This Note will compare the federal
standing model with the alternative public interest standing models developed in a
group of select states, providing the first case study to focus on the extent to which
states exercise approaches to the standing doctrine that diverge from the federal
model. This Note concludes that public interest standing models, though most
likely unfit for federal courts, are appropriate in state courts, given the significant
differences in constitutional background, governance structures, and historical
common law developments between federal and state judicial systems.
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BEYOND TAXPAYERS’ SUITS: PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN THE
STATES
JOHN DIMANNO∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question both federal and state courts have grappled
with is who should have access to the judicial system. This question is
dealt with by the doctrine of standing. Standing—along with such
doctrines as mootness, ripeness, and political question—is a justiciability
doctrine. Justiciability doctrines determine whether, when, and by whom
significant public questions ought to be adjudicated, and therefore directly
affect issues such as government accountability, public involvement in
issues of social significance, and the proper policymaking authority of
government.1 The federal system of justiciability, in particular its doctrine
of standing, has developed in part as a means of ensuring a proper
separation of powers between the branches of the federal government
through both constitutional—under the “case or controversy” requirement
of Article III2—and prudential sources of judicial restraint.3 As the
Supreme Court has noted:
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III—not only
standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the
like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping
ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than
a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,

∗
Boston College, B.A. 2004; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009. I
would like to thank Professor Richard S. Kay for his invaluable comments and guidance, without
which this Note would not have been possible. I would like to dedicate this Note to my parents, who
have given me unending love and encouragement, and have taught me to think for and believe in
myself.
1
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1961).
2
Article III provides, in part, that “[t]he Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—[and] to Controversies between two or
more States.” U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
3
The prohibition against jus tertii, or third-party standing, is one such prudential consideration.
Regarding this doctrine, the Court has stated that “even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient
to meet the ‘case or controversy’ requirement . . . the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the question of standing concerns
whether “a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”5 More
specifically, the Court has elucidated three major components to the
doctrine of constitutional standing. First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an “injury-in-fact,” that is, “an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.’”6 Second, there must be a causal link
between the conduct complained of and the injury suffered by the
plaintiff.7 Third, it must be likely, rather than simply speculative, that the
injury can be redressed by a judicial decision favoring the plaintiff.8 The
Court has also asserted that although some of the federal standing model’s
elements display prudential considerations, the central element of standing
is tied directly to Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement.9 Thus,
the Court has developed a doctrine, rooted in the Constitution, which limits
access to the federal court system to that class of litigants who possess
“concrete and particularized” injuries causally connected to another party’s
conduct.10
The Supreme Court’s constrained articulation of the law of standing
4

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166,
1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)); see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1882–83 (2001) (noting that
Article III justiciability doctrine supports this view of separation of powers in two ways: as a matter of
democratic theory, that is, as a logical means of assigning public questions to the elected branches as
they are “more politically accountable than unelected federal judges;” and as a matter of institutional
competence, that is, as a proper means of allocating policymaking to those branches of government that
possess the resources necessary to adequately assess and monitor the corresponding results). But see
Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692 (1990) (noting
that neither constitutional nor prudential standing requirements are explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, but rather that “a requirement is constitutional if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if
the Court says it is that. Nothing in the content of the doctrines explains their constitutional or
prudential status”).
5
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
6
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
7
Id. at 560; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (“[T]he
‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury
that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”).
8
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
9
Id. at 560.
10
Id. Related to the requirement for a concrete, particularized injury, the Court has asserted that
standing does not exist “when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the Court in Warth noted that this prohibition against “generalized
grievances” in taxpayer and citizen suits was a prudential bar, almost twenty years later, in Lujan, the
Court indicated that the limitation was constitutionally based, citing separation of powers concerns.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–574 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
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has led to an accordingly constrained acceptance of non-statutory public
interest actions where a litigant seeks to vindicate the public interest.11
These public interest cases often involve a litigant, as taxpayer and/or
citizen—a so-called “non-Hohfeldian” litigant12—who seeks to challenge
alleged government illegalities. The threshold question in these cases, of
course, is whether the litigant, in his or her capacity as a taxpayer and/or
citizen, has standing to challenge an alleged unconstitutional or unlawful
government action. Because the party asserting the public right is likely to
be affected no differently than the general public, the federal courts have
often denied standing to such a party due to concerns such as the
separation of powers, the need for judicial economy, and the fear of a flood
of litigation.13 Thus, the current federal standing model creates a number
of instances where a potential constitutional violation by the government
may go unchallenged.14
On the other hand, because state courts are not bound by Article III,
their role differs from that of the federal courts to varying degrees.15
Courts in many states allow broad citizen standing on the theory that
standing “must be viewed in part in light of ‘discretionary doctrines aimed
at prudently managing judicial review of the legality of public acts.’”16
Thus, although some states adhere solely to the strict federal system of
standing, many state courts have developed, through common law,
alternative standing doctrines that allow citizens or taxpayers to sue on
11
It is notable that in the federal system, as well as in many states, the legislative branch has
conferred standing to citizens to sue to enforce particular statutory provisions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C
11046(a)(1) (giving citizens the right to sue to enforce the EPCRA, a federal environmental protection
statute). This Note, however, focuses exclusively on non-statutory, common law derived citizen
standing doctrines in the states.
12
The term “non-Hohfeldian” derives from the scholar Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, who devised a
categorization of legal rights. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Ideological plaintiffs, who do
not fit into any of Hohfeld’s categories of legal rights, are termed “non-Hohfeldian.” See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (“Non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs aspire to secure the enforcement of
legal principles that touch others as directly as themselves and that are valued for moral or political
reasons independent of economic interests.”).
13
See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1968) (“The traditional requirement [for legal
injury] is one that distinguishes the particular plaintiff from the generality of citizens, taxpayers, and so
forth, and is required precisely because the argument maintains that the administration of justice is not
designed to vindicate the interest of the fungible citizen in the enforcement of the law. The plaintiff, it
would be said, must seek his relief from the political process where he, along with those who feel as he
does, will be represented by elected officials.”).
14
One commentator noted that the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize federal taxpayer standing
has effectively “written a large segment of the Constitution out of the reach of judicial protection.”
Joseph J. Giunta, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U. L.
REV. 835, 874 (1975).
15
For further discussion on the differences between state and federal courts, see infra Part III.
16
Comm. for an Effective Judiciary v. State, 679 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Mont. 1984) (quoting Stewart
v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 573 P.2d 184, 186 (Mont. 1977)).
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behalf of the public interest in cases that involve issues of great
constitutional importance.17 In these cases, it is often not necessary for a
litigant to show that his or her interest is protected by positive law, but
rather it is sufficient that the interest he or she represents is recognized as a
public value by the court. The existence of such alternative doctrines
underscores the significant weight to which many state courts give such
concerns as the vindication of the public interest and the need for checks
and balances within a tripartite system of government.
This Note compares the federal standing model with the vastly
understudied alternative public interest standing models developed in a
group of select states. As such, it provides the first case study that focuses
on the extent to which states exercise approaches to the standing doctrine
that diverge from the federal model.18 Additionally, this Note will raise
questions about the judiciary’s place in democratic governance. Though it
does not argue that the federal model ought to be altered or abandoned—
virtually inconceivable given its firm entrenchment in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence—this Note is meant to convey to the reader that liberal
forms of standing do exist and, in fact, thrive in some United States
jurisdictions.
Part II will explore the evolution of the federal standing model in the
realm of public interest actions, specifically taxpayer cases, through an
analysis of some of the key Supreme Court decisions from the last eightyfive years. Part III will begin with an overview of the broad spectrum of
state standing doctrines, particularly the states’ public interest standing
models, and will then delve into a comparative analysis of the key
differences between the federal judiciary and the states’ judiciaries in the
constitutional scheme, structurally and theoretically. These differences—
philosophical, textual, and otherwise—are meant to explain the basis on
which state courts diverge from federal courts when it comes to the issue
of standing in the context of public interest litigation.
As for the specific public interest standing doctrines among the states,
Parts IV and V will provide a detailed case study of four states which have
developed such doctrines through their common law. Part IV will focus on
states that base their public interest standing doctrines on the character of
the issue—whether the issue is of great public or constitutional importance,
and whether there is a significant public need to have the interest
17

See infra Parts IV, V.
As Professor Jaffe put it, “[m]ost of the writing on standing . . . has been preoccupied with
federal law.” Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1265, 1268 (1961). Moreover, “state constitutionalism remains intellectually isolated from a great deal
of public law scholarship. Constitutional law courses at U.S. law schools not only ignore state
constitutions, but also more generally avoid any comparative approach [between federal and state
systems].” Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1194–95 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
18
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vindicated by the judiciary. Part V will focus on states that base their
public interest standing doctrines on the character of the litigant—whether
the litigant is the best party to proceed with a given challenge, and if not,
whether the constitutional or public issue involved will go unchallenged if
such litigant is denied standing. These cases focus on the capacity of the
litigant to show some connection to the issue and the competence with
which such a litigant can advocate on behalf of the public. Thus, the
analysis within Parts IV and V illuminate the philosophy of the state courts
which have some form of public interest standing.
Ultimately, this Note proposes that non-Article III justiciability is
appropriate in states given the significant differences in constitutional
background, governance structures, and historical common law
developments between federal and state judicial systems. The analysis of
the public interest standing models will demonstrate the states’ interest in
ensuring that constitutional limitations on governmental power are
judicially enforced, as well as their commitment to limiting such review to
those cases where it is necessary to protect the citizens’ collective rights.19
II. STANDING IN PUBLIC ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: A
RESTRICTIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Historical Development of Public Action Litigation: From Frothingham
to Valley Forge
The Court’s narrow definition of injury standing in the context of
taxpayer and citizen standing was first articulated in Frothingham v.
Mellon.20 Forty-five years later, the Court changed course when, in Flast
v. Cohen, it granted standing to taxpayers challenging a federal spending
19

Some commentators have argued that such a public rights approach should be followed in the
federal courts as well. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 96 (1985)
(“[T]here is a clear collective societal interest in having the government behave in strict accord with the
Constitution. When government violates the Constitution, the stake in the outcome of the controversy
is society’s stake, and is the most fundamental interest possible: the interest in government functioning
as agreed upon by [the people] . . . .”); Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1933 (“[J]udicial review of
government practices—in particular of structural practices that a Hohfeldian rights-holder would not
otherwise challenge—creates important incentive effects that may deter unconstitutional or otherwise
arbitrary behavior and thereby secure greater government accountability.”); Jaffe, supra note 13, at
1045–46 (“Citizen participation is not simply a vehicle for minority protection, but a creative element
in government and lawmaking. . . . [I]f there is to be judicial protection of the individual from the
impact of . . . unconstitutional exercises of power . . . an action by a [non-Hohfeldian] plaintiff . . . must
be allowed.”).
20
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). In Massachusetts v. Mellon, a companion
case, the Supreme Court denied the State of Massachusetts standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the Maternity Act. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“The party who invokes the
power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”).
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21

program under the Establishment Clause.
Despite this marked
divergence, the Court has retreated to its pre-Flast jurisprudence over the
past forty years. From United States v. Richardson22 and Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War,23 to Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.24 and most
recently Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,25 the Court has
narrowed the Flast precedent, demonstrating a strict injury-based standing
model in the public action context.
In Frothingham, the plaintiff, suing as a federal taxpayer, sought to
halt expenditures under the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, which gave
financial grants to states if they cooperated in programs designed to reduce
maternal and infant mortality.26 The plaintiff claimed that the expenditures
exceeded Congress’ taxing powers and violated the Tenth Amendment’s
reservation of powers to the state governments.27 The Supreme Court held
that it did not have “power per se to review and annul acts of Congress,”
and that federal judicial review could only be exercised when a plaintiff
alleged that “some direct injury” was caused by a legislative act and “not
merely that he suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.”28
Similarly, in Ex parte Levitt, the Court extended this philosophy of
restraint in the context of a citizen suit over the constitutionality of a
Supreme Court Justice’s appointment.29 The Court held that the plaintiff
lacked standing because “it is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.”30 It was this narrow view
of the role of the federal courts in adjudicating public action cases that
informed the Court for the next thirty years.
The Court departed from its strict injury-based model in Flast, a case
involving a taxpayer challenge to a federal program providing federal
funds to assist public and private schools, including religious schools.31
The Court held that the taxpayers had standing to challenge these
congressional expenditures as a violation of the First Amendment
21

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968).
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
24
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 (1982).
25
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
26
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 488.
29
Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1937). In Levitt, the constitutionality of Justice Hugo
Black’s appointment to the United States Supreme Court was challenged because Black had voted,
while he was a Senator, to increase Supreme Court Justices’ retirement benefits, in violation of Article
I, Section 6 of the Constitution. Id.
30
Id. at 634.
31
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1968).
22
23
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prohibition against the establishment of religion by the federal
government.32 The Court distinguished Flast from Frothingham by noting
that although both cases involved challenges to government spending
programs, Flast implicated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause—
which is a limit on Congress’ taxing and spending authority—whereas
Frothingham involved the Tenth Amendment, which does not entail such
authority.33
Noting the distinction between standing requirements and separation of
powers principles, the Flast Court stated that the “question [of] whether a
particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its
own force, raise separation of powers problems . . . . [S]uch problems
arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have
adjudicated.”34 Rather, the Court noted, the threshold question of standing
was concerned with “whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.’”35 Thus, the Court did not weigh separation of powers
concerns as heavily as it did in Frothingham, departing from that precedent
to create its own test to be used in taxpayer standing cases.
In Flast, the Court articulated a two-part nexus test to determine
whether a litigant had standing as a federal taxpayer. First, the taxpayer
had to establish a logical link between his status as a taxpayer and the type
of legislation he was challenging.36 The Court qualified this requirement
by stating that a taxpayer could not challenge the expenditure of funds
merely “incidental” to a statute, but rather could only do so under the direct
employment of the taxing and spending clause of Article I, Section 8.37
32

Id. at 88.
Id. at 105.
34
Id. at 100–01. Conversely, three years before ascending to a position as Associate Justice on
the United States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia penned an influential article that summarized his views
on the role of the court in the adjudication of public actions and the nature of standing doctrine as a
means of addressing separation of powers concerns. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983). As thenJudge Scalia puts it, “[n]or is it true, as Flast suggests, that the doctrine of standing cannot possibly
have any bearing upon the allocation of power among the branches since it only excludes persons and
not issues from the courts.” Id. at 892. He concedes that because some constitutional provisions are
not amenable to particularized injury, not common to the general public, such provisions would be
barred from judicial review altogether. Id. Contrarily, in states with public interest standing doctrines,
the courts have often held that for this very reason—that the constitutional or statutory provision may
go unreviewed or unchallenged if standing is denied to the litigant—standing must be granted to assure
that such an issue of constitutional significance be addressed, to protect the people’s right to maintain
the constitutional system of justice they created. See infra Parts IV, V.
35
Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
36
Id. at 102.
37
Id. (“It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute.”). The Taxing and Spending Clause reads: “The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts
33
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Second, the Court in Flast stated that the taxpayer had to establish a
nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the nature of the alleged
constitutional infringement.38 Therefore, the litigant had to allege that
Congress’ expenditure exceeded a specific constitutionally-derived
limitation on the exercise of its taxing and spending power.39 The Court
held that the plaintiffs satisfied the two-prong nexus test because the
challenged educational program involved a “substantial expenditure of
federal tax funds” under Congress’ taxing and spending power, and
because it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment—a
specific limitation on that power.40
Notably, Justice Douglas, in his concurrence in Flast, elucidated for
the first time his position regarding the proper role of the courts in public
actions,41 a position he reinforced in his dissents in the Richardson and
Schlesinger cases.42 Justice Douglas, calling for Frothingham to be
overturned,43 advocated liberal standing requirements where all federal
taxpayers be granted standing to challenge federal expenditures.44 Arguing
a position akin to that of the state courts that allow for public interest
standing, Justice Douglas recognized that it is not only the judiciary’s
constitutional role to act as a check to overreaching by the other branches,
but it is the judiciary’s constitutional duty to do so:
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of
our federal system. With the growing complexities of
government it is often the one and only place where effective
relief can be obtained. If the judiciary were to become a
super-legislative group sitting in judgment on the affairs of
people, the situation would be intolerable. But where wrongs
to individuals are done by violation of specific guarantees, it

and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
38
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (“Such inquiries into the nexus between the status
asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and
appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power.”).
39
Id. at 102–03. The Court did not indicate which, if any, other constitutional provisions limited
Congress’ taxing and spending power.
40
Id. at 103.
41
Id. at 110 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he role of the federal courts is not only to serve as
referee between the States and the center but also to protect the individual against prohibited conduct
by the other two branches of the Federal Government.”).
42
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 197, 201–02 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229–31 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
43
Flast, 392 U.S. at 111 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We have a Constitution designed to keep
government out of private domains. But the fences have often been broken down; and Frothingham
denied effective machinery to restore them.”).
44
Id. at 114.
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45

is abdication for courts to close their doors.

Although at the time Flast signified a potential shift by the Court
toward recognizing a more liberalized standard for taxpayer and citizen
standing,46 the precedent has since been limited to its facts by subsequent
cases, including the Hein case in 2007. The first two cases that narrowed
the Flast precedent and “embraced private rights and separation of powers
principles in the context of public actions”47 were United States v.
Richardson48 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,49
both decided on the same day in 1974.
In Richardson, the plaintiff claimed that a congressional enactment
providing that the Central Intelligence Agency may keep its budget secret
was unconstitutional because it violated the Accounts Clause.50 The Court
distinguished Richardson from Flast by noting that the Accounts Clause
was not a limitation on Congress’ taxing and spending power, and that the
plaintiff-taxpayer was not challenging a statute enacted under the taxing
and spending power, but rather one regulating the reporting of
expenditures by the CIA.51 The Court noted that the litigant, claiming
injury only as a citizen and federal taxpayer, lacked standing because he
sought “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government” rather than alleging violation
of a particular constitutional right.52
In Richardson, the plaintiff argued that if he was denied standing,
nobody could have standing, and that the Accounts Clause would be
rendered an unenforceable constitutional provision.53 The Court used this
very claim to reinforce its private rights model—requiring concrete,
particularized injury to procure standing in a public action—by stating that
“the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims
gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of . . . the political process.”54
45

Id. at 111.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 601 (1968)
(“The narrow holding [in Flast] seems impregnable and seems destined to become a long-term
cornerstone of the law of standing.”).
47
Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale for
Public Actions, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 361 (1993).
48
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974).
49
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–17 (1974).
50
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 168. The Accounts Clause provides, in part, that “a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
51
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (“[T]here is no logical nexus between the asserted status of
taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed
report of the expenditures of that agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)) (citations omitted).
53
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
54
Id.
46
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Similarly, in Schlesinger, the Court denied citizen and taxpayer
standing where the plaintiffs sought to prevent members of Congress from
serving in the military reserves, which the plaintiffs claimed was a
violation of the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause.55 As in Richardson,
stating that a concrete injury rather than a generalized grievance is required
for justiciability, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing as
citizens because they sought to “have the Judicial Branch compel the
Executive Branch to act in conformity with the Incompatibility Clause, an
interest shared by all citizens.”56 The Court noted that to hold otherwise
“would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role
of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and
open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing government by
injunction.”57
As in his concurrence in Flast58 and in his dissenting opinions in both
Richardson and Schlesinger, Justice Douglas stated his philosophy
regarding the proper role of the courts in the constitutional scheme.59
Justice Douglas proposed a liberalized standing model in cases involving
issues of constitutional importance that might otherwise go unchecked by
any of the branches of the federal government.60 Particularly in his
Schlesinger dissent, Justice Douglas reaffirmed his view that the Court
must, in its discretion, grant standing to a citizen or taxpayer if the
constitutional provision would otherwise go unchallenged:
The interest of the citizen in this constitutional question
is, of course, common to all citizens. But . . . “standing is not
to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury. . . . To deny standing to persons who are in fact
injured simply because many others are also injured, would
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government
actions could be questioned by nobody.”61
After limiting taxpayer standing to the specific set of facts in Flast, the
55
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974). The
Incompatibility Clause provides that “no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2.
56
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.
57
Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
59
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 200–01 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(referring to the views expressed in his Schlesinger dissent); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 232–34 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (describing the role of standing in the judicial process).
60
See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 234 (“The interest of citizens in guarantees written in the
Constitution seems obvious. . . . The ‘personal stake’ in the present case is keeping the Incompatibility
Clause an operative force in the Government by freeing the entanglement of the federal bureaucracy
with the Legislative Branch.”); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 202 (“[R]esolutions of any doubts or
ambiguities should be toward protecting an individual’s stake in the integrity of constitutional
guarantees rather than turning him away without even a chance to be heard.”).
61
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 235 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687–88 (1973)).
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Court went a step further by narrowing Establishment Clause taxpayer
standing in Valley Forge.62 In that case, a group of taxpayers and citizens
challenged the transfer of a federal government-owned hospital to a
religious organization pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act, which authorized the executive branch to dispose of surplus
property.63 The plaintiffs alleged that the transfer of the property violated
the Establishment Clause on the ground that it constituted government aid
to religion.64 Noting that the Establishment Clause ought not to be
regarded differently than any other constitutional provision for the
purposes of standing,65 the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they sued merely as taxpayers interested in ensuring that
government conform to its constitutional duties, failing to identify any
personal injury “other than the psychological consequence presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”66 The
Court distinguished Flast by stating that the plaintiffs in Valley Forge were
not challenging a congressional statute authorized by the taxing and
spending power but rather an executive decision—through the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare—to transfer government property
authorized by the Property Clause.67
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, admonished the Court for
its contrived narrowing of Flast to challenges of Congressional spending
power, noting the inherent contradiction of the Court’s artificial distinction
between the two cases.68 Specifically, he noted that in Flast the plaintiffs
challenged the executive action of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, exactly as in Valley Forge.69 Justice Brennan offered a
scathing rebuke of the majority’s abstruse reading of Flast and federal
standing doctrine in public actions, accusing the Court of “attempt[ing] to
distinguish this case from Flast by wrenching snippets of language from
our opinions . . . [and creating] tortuous distinctions . . . [that] are specious,

62
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 (1982).
63
Id. at 469.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 484 (“[W]e know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional
values or a complementary ‘sliding scale’ of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the
judicial power of the United States.”).
66
Id. at 485.
67
Id. at 479.
68
Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 491 (“[T]he [majority] opinion utterly fails . . . to explain why this case is unlike Flast v.
Cohen . . . and is controlled instead by Frothingham v. Mellon.”) (citations omitted); see also id. at 512
(“Whether undertaken pursuant to the Property Clause or the Spending Clause, the breach of the
Establishment Clause, and the relationship of the taxpayer to that breach, is precisely the same.”). In
fact, the named defendant in Flast was Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
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at best: at worst . . . pernicious to our constitutional heritage.” Justice
Brennan suggested that traditional standing doctrine should be modified to
fit the cases—rather than be mechanically followed—in order that the
judiciary might redress government wrongdoing that might otherwise go
unchecked. This philosophy—mirroring that of Justice Douglas71 as well
as the state courts which have developed public interest standing
models72—would not ultimately prevail in the federal courts. Instead, the
Court, with few exceptions, continued its trend of limited judicial access to
plaintiffs in public actions after Valley Forge.
B. Hein: Further Narrowing of the Flast Exception to the Preclusion of
Federal Taxpayer Standing and the Current State of Public Action
Litigation in the Federal Courts
After Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge, taxpayer standing in
the federal courts appeared permissible only if the plaintiff challenged a
government expenditure as violating the Establishment Clause. Moreover,
the Flast precedent itself seemed to be on shaky ground.73 It was within
this jurisprudential framework that the Court, last Term, decided Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.74 In Hein, the Court held that
plaintiff-taxpayers did not have standing under Flast because the
challenged expenditures were not made pursuant to an Act of Congress,
but rather were made under general appropriations to the Executive Branch
to fund day-to-day activities.75
The executive branch appropriations that the plaintiffs in Hein
challenged were funding President Bush’s White House Office of FaithBased and Community Initiatives and similar offices in various federal
departments; these offices sponsored conferences throughout the country to
educate faith-based organizations about the availability of federal
funding.76 The plaintiffs, as federal taxpayers, claimed that the executive
branch violated the Establishment Clause by “organizing conferences at
which faith-based organizations . . . are singled out as being particularly
worthy of federal funding . . . and the belief in God is extolled as
70

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 494 n.5 (“When the
Constitution makes it clear that a particular person is to be protected from a particular form of
government action, then that person has a ‘right’ to be free of that action; when that right is infringed,
then there is injury . . . within the meaning of Art. III.”).
71
See supra notes 41–45, 59–61 and accompanying text.
72
See, e.g., infra Parts IV, V.
73
Note, however, that Flast was reaffirmed in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988)
(holding that, under Flast, taxpayers had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Adolescent
Family Life Act, which provided grants conditioned on specific types of counseling to prevent teenage
pregnancy).
74
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
75
Id. at 2566 (plurality opinion).
76
Id. at 2560.
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distinguishing the claimed effectiveness of faith-based social services.”
Relying on stare decisis to “leave Flast as we found it,”78 Justice Alito,
writing for a plurality of three Justices, held that the suit did not fall under
the narrow exception that Flast had created to the traditional rule against
taxpayer standing established in Frothingham.79 The Court held that the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first prong of Flast’s nexus test—requiring
that there be a nexus between taxpayer status and the type of legislative
action attacked—because the challenged expenditures were neither
expressly authorized nor mandated by any specific congressional
enactment.80 Not only did the plurality refuse to extend the Flast holding
to discretionary executive branch expenditures, it also interpreted
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge as barring taxpayers from
challenging acts of executive discretion.81
Fearing a flood of litigation in the federal courts, Justice Alito noted
that expanding Flast to purely executive expenditures would subject every
federal action—including conferences and speeches—to a challenge by
any taxpayer under the Establishment Clause, since “almost all Executive
Branch activity is ultimately funded by some congressional
appropriation.”82 Justice Alito noted, as Justice Kennedy did in his
concurrence,83 that there were significant separation of powers concerns
inherent in public action litigation.84 Further, he stated that relaxing
standing requirements would lead to an expansion of judicial power, and
that “lowering the taxpayer standing bar to permit challenges of purely
executive actions ‘would significantly alter the allocation of power at the
national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of
government.’”85
Justice Scalia, in a vigorous concurrence joined by Justice Thomas,
challenged the Court: “Either Flast . . . should be applied to (at a
minimum) all challenges to the governmental expenditure of general tax
revenues in a manner alleged to violate a constitutional provision
specifically limiting the taxing and spending power, or Flast should be
repudiated.”86 Justice Scalia himself would choose the latter course,
77

Id.
Id. at 2572. Justice Alito noted that Hein does not occasion the court to reconsider the Flast
precedent, since the issue is whether Flast should be extended, not whether it should apply. Id. at 2571.
As Justice Alito asserts, “[i]t is a necessary concomitant of the doctrine of stare decisis that a precedent
is not always expanded to the limit of its logic. That was the approach that then-Justice Rehnquist took
. . . in Valley Forge, and it is the approach we take here.” Id.
79
Id. at 2571–72.
80
Id. at 2566.
81
See id. at 2568–69 (noting that “the Flast exception has largely been confined to its facts”).
82
Id. at 2569.
83
Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84
Id. at 2570.
85
Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
86
Id. at 2573–74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78
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effectively overriding Flast.
Fearing that a liberal taxpayer standing
model would “[transform] . . . courts into ‘ombudsmen of the general
welfare,’”88 he urged the Court to overrule Flast, which he believed created
a precedent that was “wholly irreconcilable” with Article III limitations on
federal court justiciability.89
Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by three other Justices, argued that
there was no rationale “in either logic or precedent” to the illusory
distinction between legislative and executive causation of injury, where
standing was granted in the former but not the latter case.90 Indeed, Justice
Souter asserted that both logic91 and precedent92 militated that Flast be
followed. The dissent also questioned why the plurality demonstrated
greater deference to executive action than to legislative action.93 Justice
Souter noted that in this unmanageable view of the principle of separation
of powers, “if the Executive could accomplish through the exercise of
discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation,
Establishment Clause protection would melt away.”94
Thus, Hein was yet another in a long line of Supreme Court cases—
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge, among others—that have
denied public action litigation on standing grounds. Moreover, the
conservative makeup of the current Court demonstrates that such a rigid
formulation of standing in the public action context will be strictly adhered
to for years to come. However, the plurality’s rationale in Hein—in
particular, the line it drew in distinguishing the case from Flast—was
unpersuasive and arbitrary. The plurality in Hein was afraid that if the
87
Id. at 2574. Justice Scalia criticized the plurality for “laying just claim to be honoring stare
decisis . . . [while simultaneously] beating Flast to a pulp and then sending it out to the lower courts
weakened, denigrated, more incomprehensible than ever, and yet somehow technically alive.” Id. at
2584.
88
Id. at 2582 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982)).
89
Id. at 2574.
90
Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in his Valley Forge dissent, voiced similar
concern about the Court’s distinction between actions of the legislative branch and those of the
executive branch:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an expenditure for which the last government
actor, either implementing directly the legislative will, or acting within the scope of
legislatively delegated authority, is not an Executive Branch official. The First
Amendment binds the Government as a whole, regardless of which branch is at
work in a particular instance.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
511 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91
See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2585 (2007) (“[T]here is no
dispute that taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding conferences, and these are alleged to
have the purpose of promoting religion.”).
92
See id. at 2586 (“[In Bowen,] we recognized the equivalence between a challenge to a
congressional spending bill and a claim that the Executive Branch was spending an appropriation, each
in violation of the Establishment Clause.”).
93
Id.
94
Id.

2008]

PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN STATES

655

plaintiffs were allowed to challenge any federal expenditure on
Establishment grounds, then the federal courts would invariably be flooded
with claims scrutinizing nearly everything an administration did.95 But this
fear only exists because of the confusion regarding Establishment Clause
jurisprudence; the Court has yet to settle on any coherent approach to such
cases. Thus, the floodgates fears expressed by the Court are a result of its
own doing, and can only be ameliorated by clearer, more consistent rules
regarding standing in public action cases.
The line drawn by the Court followed only by three Justices
comprising the plurality shows the Court’s tendency to ground its decisions
too much in precedent as opposed to constitutional principle and
coherence.96 Rather than defending the line he has drawn, Justice Alito
merely argued that the language in Flast appeared to distinguish
congressional and executive actions, and that subsequent cases—
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge—have incorporated such a
Although the distinction between congressional and
distinction.97
executive expenditures is illusory,98 it seems this was the only decision the
Court could have made given the logic it followed—adhering strictly to the
doctrine of stare decisis.99 However, the premise underlying such a
distinction is inherently flawed. Notably, a provision in the Constitution’s
Appropriations Clause states that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”100 This
mandates that expenditures from the Treasury must be approved by statute
to ensure democratic accountability. Therefore, for an executive program
to be funded, it must, in essence, be a congressional program as well. So,
what logically follows is that if all government expenditures owe their
legitimacy to congressional authorization, it makes no sense to distinguish
between expenditures Congress explicitly directed and those which arise
from executive discretion.
The impact Hein will have on the Court’s jurisprudence in public
action litigation is clear. This precedent leaves open an area of
government action that likely cannot be challenged in the federal courts. It
forecloses an entire class of individuals from suing for violations of the

95

See id. at 2569 (“Because almost all Executive Branch activity is ultimately funded by some
congressional appropriation, extending the Flast exception to purely executive expenditures would
effectively subject every federal action—be it a conference, proclamation or speech—to Establishment
Clause challenge by any taxpayer in federal court.”).
96
See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text.
97
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568–69 (2007).
98
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
99
See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569 (noting that such a distinction between executive and legislative
action had already been made by the Court in Valley Forge).
100
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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Establishment Clause.
Moreover, although the Court did not formally
overturn Flast, in effect it weakened it to such a degree that it has become
virtually inapplicable and irrelevant. The Court allowed for a bypass that
routes around Flast—that is, general appropriations can be provided to
executive departments that, in their discretion, may be used to support
religious programs. This incentivizes Congress to avoid explicitly
expressing its policy choices, acting instead covertly through executive
discretion in order to fall under the auspices of Hein rather than Flast.
Also, this would allow the executive branch to enact policy choices simply
by deciding how to spend a blank check offered by Congress. This
outcome and the lessening of congressional accountability that would
result from the increase in disbursing money as general appropriations
rather than through congressional spending would undermine separation of
powers and non-delegation principles. Thus, the Court’s dubious linedrawing in Hein raises serious concerns about the federal standing model
and its unevenness in adjudicating public interest actions.
With these concerns revealed, the rest of this Note will explore the
spectrum of standing doctrines in the states, with particular emphasis on
those states which utilize liberal approaches to public interest actions.
III. STATE SYSTEMS OF STANDING: A SPECTRUM OF DOCTRINES AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Overview of State Standing Doctrines and Introduction to Public
Interest Standing in the States

Unlike federal taxpayers in federal courts, municipal taxpayers and
state taxpayers in nearly every state have standing to sue in public action
cases, with variations by jurisdiction in terms of the source and content of
such taxpayer standing requirements.102 Moreover, many states also have
common law-derived alternative standing doctrines that allow citizens or
taxpayers to sue on behalf of the public interest in cases involving issues of
great constitutional importance.103
State courts are not bound by Article III,104 and, as such, many state
standing doctrines diverge from the federal model of standing discussed in

101
The states discussed in Parts IV and V address the issue of whether such a foreclosure, in fact,
necessitates judicial review. See infra Parts IV, V.
102
See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1854–55 (noting that taxpayers in almost every state can
challenge public expenditures without a showing of a particularized injury).
103
See infra Parts IV, V.
104
See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by
the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability.”).
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105

Part II of this Note.
These states maintain some form of injury-based
standing as a threshold test of justiciability,106 but differ from the federal
system by, for example, issuing advisory opinions,107 granting standing to
taxpayers challenging the misuse of public funds,108 resolving moot
disputes,109 and authorizing citizen standing in matters of significant public
importance, which is the focus of this Note.110
In granting public interest standing, these jurisdictions focus on,
among other factors, both the character of the issue and the character of the
litigant to determine whether or not to grant standing to a non-Hohfeldian
litigant. The character of the issue factor queries whether the issue is of
great public or constitutional importance and whether there is a pressing
need to get the particular public interest vindicated by the judiciary. The
character of the litigant factor deals with the capacity of the putative
plaintiff to be the best advocate for the public interest involved, both in the
sense that he or she shows a connection with the question presented, and he
or she possesses the competence and seriousness necessary to be a good
advocate. It also considers whether the provision in question would go
unchallenged if such plaintiff were denied standing.
Public interest standing doctrines vary by state as a result of
differences in historical developments, economic and social considerations,
states’ governing structures, and states’ jurisprudential concerns. Despite
the differences, these state courts share a commitment, within a
discretionary framework, to vindicating shared constitutional interests
where legislative activity or executive action or inaction have led to
injuries that are not specific to individual litigants, but rather where “the
legal right [the litigants] seek to enforce is not the correlative of a legal

105
See supra Part II. Despite the divergent trend in many states, a number of jurisdictions adhere
to a strict injury-based standing analysis that derives in part from the Article III federal model. See,
e.g., Ferguson Mech. Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 282 Conn. 764 (2007); Goto v. D.C. Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1980); Henderson v. Miller, 592 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., 479 Mich. 280 (2007);
City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001); Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364
(2001).
106
See, e.g., Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah 2006).
107
See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1844–52 (discussing state courts that issue advisory opinions).
108
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109
See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1859–61 (discussing state courts that resolve moot disputes).
110
See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1987); Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d
1013 (Ariz. 1998); Ho‘opulapula v. Bd. of Land and Natural Res., 143 P.3d 1230 (Haw. 2006); State ex
rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978 (Ind. 2003); Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v.
Comm’r of Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 1996); Stewart v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Big Horn
County, 573 P.2d 184 (Mont. 1977); Cunningham v. Exon, 276 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. 1979); State ex rel.
Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); State ex rel. Howard v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1980);
Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988); Stumes v. Bloomberg, 551 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 1996);
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 of
Snohomish County, 459 P.2d 633 (Wash. 1969).
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duty owed to them.”
State courts with public interest standing doctrines have been
successful in balancing the need to address important constitutional issues
with the need to limit the judiciary’s interference with other branches of
government.112 The proliferation of alternative judicial practices in these
states raises questions about conventional assumptions regarding judicial
capacity and restraint, the role of courts in the interpretation and
enforcement of constitutional norms, and the idea of inherent limitations to
adjudication.113 What is it about the state judiciary, or more generally the
governing structure of the states, that make state courts more hospitable to
a public interest standing model than the federal courts? An analysis of
prudential and policy considerations is necessary to adequately address this
inquiry.
B. Policy Considerations: Differences between Federal and State Courts
1. Textual Differences between Federal and State Constitutions
The constitutional source of federal justiciability doctrine rests in
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, which the Court has
interpreted as restricting the business of federal courts to “questions
presented . . . in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process.”114 However, state courts have noted that the “case or
controversy” requirement in Article III does not exist in many state
constitutions, and that such states are not bound by the same justiciability

111

Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1854. Conversely, in the federal courts, constitutional and
prudential limitations, reflecting separation of powers concerns, have led to a policy of denying
standing in cases where the vindication of public rights is sought without evidence of direct injury to
the litigant. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (“[I]gnoring the concrete
injury requirement . . . would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct
constitutional role of the Third Branch . . . . Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest
in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief
Executive.”).
112
Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1854. “Because state constitutions include many substantive social
and economic provisions, taxpayer [and citizen] standing provides an important mechanism for
regulatory enforcement and policy elaboration . . . . It also affords state courts opportunities to reshape
government structures in light of evolving needs.” Id. at 1855 (footnote omitted).
113
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the legitimacy of granting standing in cases of
great public importance, where direct injury may be untenable: “There would be nothing irrational
about a system that granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate under
one or another variant of such a regime.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997). See generally
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Richard S. Kay ed., 2005) (detailing the standing doctrines of twelve
countries in the context of challenges regarding the constitutionality of government acts, including
countries with doctrines similar to the public interest standing doctrines in the states, such as Canada,
which has a discretionary doctrine that grants standing to litigants in cases where such litigants possess
no particularized, concrete injury distinct from the general public).
114
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
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115

limitations as their federal counterparts.
Accordingly, the absence of
Article III language, or its functional equivalent, is taken to correlate with
an increase in the scope of judicial review related to legislative and
executive actions in states with liberal standing doctrines.116
Many state courts diverge even further from Article III jurisprudence
as a result of additional textual differences. For example, some state
constitutions possess “open court” provisions that guarantee public access
to the courts and restrict the state legislature’s power to regulate judicial
authority.117 Moreover, unlike the federal Constitution, every state
constitution has gone through substantial amendment over the years, and
thus explicitly provides for more public rights and interests that state courts
Consequently, many
must accordingly interpret and enforce.118
commentators agree that “these new forms of property have ‘generated
pressure to increase judicial control of administrative conduct beyond what
could be fairly assimilated within the Hohfeldian framework’ that current
federal justiciability doctrine accepts.”119
2. Electoral Accountability of State Judges
As explained in Part II of this Note, the separation of powers doctrine
has historically played an essential and often dispositive role in the federal
system of standing.120 The significance of the separation of powers policy
in federal justiciability doctrine is based, in part, on the institutional
structure of the federal government, namely that of a single President aided
by administrative agencies, a bicameral Congress elected by majoritarian
process, and Article III courts that are unelected, independent, and
(theoretically) apolitical.121
State government institutions differ markedly from the federal
structure, and thus the separation of powers doctrine plays a different, far
less pivotal role in state courts’ systems of standing.122 For example, state
115
See, e.g., Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 2005) (“We have
previously concluded that ‘the question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we
have no counterpart to the case or controversy requirement of the federal constitution’ . . . and thus,
when addressing questions of standing ‘we are confronted only with questions of prudential or judicial
restraint.’”) (quoting Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Arizona, 712
P.2d 914, 919 (Ariz. 1985)); Keller v. Flaherty, 600 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (“Ohio has
no constitutional counterpart to Section 2, Article III.”).
116
See infra Parts IV, V.
117
Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1880.
118
Id. at 1881.
119
Id. at 1882 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279–
80 n.14 (1984)).
120
See supra Part II (discussing the key Supreme Court decisions from the last eighty-five years
that shaped the federal standing model in the realm of public interest actions).
121
Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1883.
122
Id. at 1886 (“Although separation of powers shows marked variation in the fifty states, one can
draw general distinctions between the state systems and the federal system that implicate justiciability
and challenge many of the assumptions underlying federal doctrine as applied to state courts.”).
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court judges are perceived as more actively engaged in the political process
than their Article III federal counterparts because they are popularly
elected in all but a few jurisdictions,123 have often had prior legislative
experience as state legislators, and participate to a greater degree in
shaping the law.124 Hence, the court system carries a “democratic
portfolio.”125 Generally speaking, state court judges—many of whom are
without the protection of a life tenure—are more politically dependent than
federal court judges.126 Further reflecting the political accountability of
state judges is the fact that state judicial districts tend to be smaller than
their federal equivalents.127 Accordingly, state judges are likely to be more
closely tied to their local communities and respond more actively to local
issues.128 Because state judges are closer to and more familiar with local
problems, and are the products of local political processes, they may be
better equipped than federal judges to work effectively with other branches
of government in developing new constitutional resolutions and to deal
with the fiscal ramifications of such decisions.129
An elected judiciary, among other factors, also provides for state
Professor Hershkoff notes that the balance of power among the branches of government within the
states’ governing systems tends to be more diffuse than that of the federal governing system, which
emphasizes the importance of clear delineations among the branches: in states, “[p]ower is instead
diffused horizontally across the branches, as well as vertically between the states and myriad local
units, reflecting . . . a ‘principle of shared, rather than completely separated powers . . . a system of
separateness with interdependence, autonomy with reciprocity.’” Id. at 1905 (quoting Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the American Bar Association
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, Washington D.C., (Dec. 13, 1996),
12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 69, 71 (1996)).
123
Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1158; see id. (“The fact of judicial election . . . alter[s] the
political vulnerability of state judges, subjecting them to a kind of popular veto that in theory sets a
boundary or tether on judicial decisionmaking.”).
124
See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999) (“Thirty-nine of the
fifty states presently provide a measure of political accountability for judges through some form of
election.”); Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1939 (“The local and populist decisionmaking devices that
characterize nonfederal lawmaking increase the opportunities for factions to seize control of political
power, necessitating oversight that might include judicial review.”); Hans A. Linde, The State and
Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La Difference!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005)
(“[S]tate courts are closer to politics than their federal colleagues, whether the state judges are elected
or appointed.”).
125
Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1887.
126
Id.; see also John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues as a Reflection of Political
Economy, in STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 257, 285
(Richard S. Kay ed., 2005) (“Most state court judges are elected for terms, rather than appointed for life
like the federal judges, making them arguably more democratically responsive and more suitable to
wield the expanded lawmaking power, which liberal standing rules confer.”).
127
Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1887.
128
Id. at 1168.
129
Id.; see Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985) (“[S]tate judges are
systematically exposed to and experienced in the legal institutions of their states . . . . [and] are much
more likely than are their federal counterparts to know or be able to learn readily what is out there, how
it came to be, and how well or badly it works.”).
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130

courts’ “inherent” or “plenary” authority. While federal district courts—
which only possess jurisdiction authorized by Congress pursuant to Article
III, Section 1 of the federal Constitution131—have limited and constrained
authority, state judicial power is more expansive in scope and breadth. The
idea of a state judiciary’s inherent authority lends credibility and
democratic legitimacy to a state court’s independent and activist role in
shaping public policy and engaging in public interest decision-making.132
Thus, even where a state constitution or statutory scheme does not provide
for an explicit grant of jurisdiction, a state court’s plenary power gives it a
persuasive rationale for expanding its jurisdictional scope to cases
involving non-Hohfeldian litigants.
3. Prevalence of Positive Rights in State Constitutions
There is a greater specificity in state constitutional provisions relative
to federal provisions; that is, state constitutions provide for positive rights
that mandate action on the part of the state government, whereas the
federal Constitution only provides negative rights by restraining
government action as a means of addressing issues of federalism and
separation of powers.133 State constitutions address a wider range of social
and economic issues than the federal Constitution, including public
These state
schooling, welfare, and environmental regulation.134
provisions encourage and often depend upon judicial involvement for their
interpretation and enforcement. In fact, many state courts display a
willingness to grant standing in cases where a litigant does not suffer a
direct injury but where judicial review is otherwise necessary because the
case involves “a controversy [that] is of substantial public importance,
immediately affect[ing] significant segments of the population, and [that]
has a direct bearing on commerce, finance, labor, industry, or
agriculture.”135
While federal justiciability doctrine reflects deference to Congress and
the Executive regarding policymaking and enforcement, state courts are
130

Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1888.
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art III, § 1
(emphasis added).
132
See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1888 (“[S]tate courts emphasize the importance of such
[plenary] authority to maintaining their independence relative to the other branches and to the
people.”).
133
See id. at 1889–90 (“[B]ecause state constitutions often include positive rights and regulatory
norms, their texts explicitly engage state courts in substantive areas that have historically been outside
the Article III domain.”).
134
Id. at 1839.
135
Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419, 424 (Wash. 2004); see
Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1972) (“State courts
settle contests over public offices, pass on the propriety of proposed public expenditures and even of
proposed constitutional amendments, often at the suit of mere ‘taxpayers.’”).
131
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often more engaged in these aspects of governance.
This is due in large
part to the fact that state constitutions reflect less faith in state legislatures
than the federal Constitution does in Congress; state constitutions tend to
impose substantive and procedural requirements on legislative activity,
often seen in the area of state fiscal authority.137 Also, through popular
mechanisms such as referendums and initiatives, state constitutions are
more easily amendable than the federal Constitution.138 Through such
amendments, state constitutions have expanded the list of rights and
Accordingly, a state
interests that state courts may interpret.139
legislature’s failure to adhere to such explicit constitutional demands
invokes the judiciary’s role as an elaborator of the constitutional mandate
and vindicator of the public interest.140 Therefore, state courts play a
pivotal role in the vindication of public rights and the public interest by
being more actively engaged in protecting the people from government’s
constitutional violations.
4. Lack of Federalism Concerns in State Courts
Federalism deals with the proper boundary between national and state
or local governmental affairs. The federalist structure of government—that
is, the distinctive vertical power division between the federal and state
governing institutions—is implicated in various provisions of the federal
Constitution.141 The Supreme Court has traditionally adhered to the
recognition of federalist constraints and the principle of comity that favors
state sovereignty over federal judicial authority.142 Article III judicial
restraint in the area of state sovereignty serves federalism values by
136

Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1891–92.
See id. at 1894 (“[S]uch provisions alter the dynamics of lawmaking, implicating the state
courts in the resolution of certain governance questions that are largely outside the Article III
experience.”).
138
See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1888 (citing John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal
System, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (1988)).
139
Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1881. Conversely, the federal Constitution “leaves the vast
majority of social decisions to elected officials. It does not specify whether taxes should be high or
low. It neither requires nor forbids governments to offer welfare benefits . . . [and] [i]t does not specify
what government departments should exist and how they should be structured; that is for Congress to
decide.” Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 125 (2007) (citations
omitted).
140
See Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1156 (“Unlike federal courts, state courts are frequently
counted on to resolve constitutional questions that implicate the courts directly in day-to-day political
issues and that encourage them to act as interdependent members of state government.”) (internal
quotation omitted).
141
For example, Article I states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in . . .
Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The implication is that Congress can act only if there is clearly
vested authority, with all other governance left to the states. Further clarifying this and other federalist
implications within the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
142
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999) (noting that the federal system created
by the Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the states).
137
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143

promoting self-governance and accountability.
While federalism exists on the federal level to temper the scope of
federal courts’ judicial review, it does not have such an effect on state
courts.144 The decision of a particular state court, which binds only the
people of that state, is viewed as having more democratic legitimacy and
local relevance than the decision of its Article III federal counterpart.145
Moreover, a state court’s ruling often fosters public dialogue between the
branches of state government and the people, whereas the “finality of
federal constitutional adjudication” often tends to halt public discourse in
its tracks.146
State constitutions are readily subject to revision through a number of
procedural mechanisms absent from Article V in the U.S. Constitution,147
such as the citizen initiative, which allows a minority of a state’s electorate
to put a proposed constitutional change on the ballot for consideration by
the entire electorate.148 Consequently, state court judges exercise, in the
words of one commentator, “a greater willingness to experiment with legal
norms, on the assumption that their judgments comprise only the opening
statement in a public dialogue with the other branches of government and
the people.”149 Such a judicial approach explains the prevalence in state
courts of public interest litigation challenging the constitutionality of
government actions.
As this analysis has demonstrated, the prevalence of public interest
standing in state courts is a result of the extent to which the states’
governing institutions and the balance of such institutions often differ
markedly from that of the federal structure. It is with this as a background
that the next parts of this Note—Parts IV and V—explore the
characteristics of select states’ public interest standing doctrines through an
in-depth case study.150
143

Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1900–01.
See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271,
278 (1998) (“Whereas states occupy an essential role in the American constitutional system, there is no
equivalent principle of federalism . . . in state constitutionalism.”); see also Hershkoff, supra note 18, at
1168 (“State courts themselves cite an absence of federalism concerns, to justify both their enforcement
of positive rights . . . and their use of non-Article III interpretive techniques.”).
145
Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1902.
146
See id. (“State courts can thus serve an agenda-setting function that produces greater
democratic discourse and encourages the participatory values associated with federalism.”); see also
Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1169 (“[S]tate courts, working collaboratively with the elected branches,
afford citizens greater opportunities to participate in the process of governance.”).
147
See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring either two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or an
application from two-thirds of the states to propose a constitutional amendment, and further requiring
three-fourths of the states by legislative vote or by convention for such constitutional amendment to be
ratified).
148
Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1163 (discussing the citizen initiative).
149
Id. (internal citation omitted).
150
See infra Parts IV, V. The case study approach by which these Parts are framed is unique to
the area of state justiciability research. As Professor Hershkoff stated, “[f]uture empirical research
144
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IV. PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN SELECT STATES: CHARACTER OF THE
ISSUE AS BASIS FOR JUSTICIABILITY
As Part II showed, the Supreme Court’s constrained approach to public
actions sweeps so broadly that it renders some constitutional provisions
judicially unreviewable and thus futile as limitations on government
power. Conversely, the state courts surveyed in Parts IV and V display a
common jurisprudential thread grounded in the rationale that the courts
must hear those public interest cases meeting the criteria of their respective
public interest standing doctrines in order to ensure that portions of the
state constitutions are not left unenforceable. The doctrines demonstrate
the idea that judicial review is a necessary component of the states’
systems of limited government powers; there would be no effective check
on the elected branches without such review.151 Though this public rights
approach is unlikely—and perhaps even unfit—to be applied in the federal
courts, it seems an appropriate approach in the states in cases where the
constitutional provision at issue protects societal rights, rather than merely
individual rights.152 Through the use of public interest standing models,
this approach limits judicial review in public actions to circumstances
where it is necessary to protect collective, societal rights while
simultaneously ensuring that constitutional limitations on governmental
power are judicially enforced.153
The states that possess public interest standing doctrines focus on
various factors by which to grant or deny public interest standing under
their respective models. These factors form a mosaic by which the courts
use their discretion to balance the competing interests involved in the
context of public interest cases. While the courts often weigh the multiple
factors equally, the states selected for the purposes of this Note can be used
to illustrate two key factors—the character of the issue and the character of
the litigant.
New Mexico and Ohio are two states that aptly illustrate the first
could usefully focus on the extent to which states currently exercise nonfederal approaches to
justiciability doctrine, and the relation between existing state institutional structures and the scope of
the judicial function.” Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1842.
151
See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1284 (“Intervention in [public actions] may rest not so much on the
‘judiciality’ of the issue as on the lack of an alternative forum: When the claimant is not likely to obtain
justice elsewhere, the judiciary is justified in running the risks of straining its competence.”).
152
The fact that public interest standing models work in the states, whereas there is no equivalent
in the federal system, is likely the result of the differences between state and federal courts discussed in
Part III, supra. See also Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1978) (“[I]ts defense must
lie in characteristics of the state courts, ostensibly not shared by the federal courts—familiarity with
local conditions and state law, the ability to fashion rules and relief confined in scope to their own
states, [and] closeness to the state's legislative and political processes.”).
153
See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1919 (“Granting standing or hearing some other form of public
action also has expressive value, conferring status and legitimacy on self-defined groups of litigants,
with consequent positive effects on public discourse and public policy.”) (internal citations omitted).
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factor—the character of the issue as a basis for the determination of
whether to grant or deny standing to non-Hohfeldian litigants in public
interest cases. This factor deals with (1) whether the issue involved in the
litigation is of great public or constitutional importance, and (2) whether
there is a great public need to have the interest or rule vindicated by the
judiciary, as opposed to leaving the issue to be addressed through the
political process.154 Thus, a balancing of competing interests and a
weighing of costs and benefits to both the public and to the judiciary—its
independence and autonomy—are considered by these state courts on a
case-by-case basis in the implementation of their discretionary standing
doctrines.
A. New Mexico: Public Importance Doctrine
As a well-established exception to its traditional doctrine of injury
standing, New Mexico’s “public importance doctrine” provides a
discretionary grant of standing for private parties who otherwise lack
standing under the traditional framework.155 The doctrine offers private
litigants—as taxpayers, citizens, or voters—an opportunity to present to
the judiciary a grievance that may be generalized in nature. However, for
the issue to be of sufficient “public importance,” it must involve a
government action that allegedly interferes with “the essential nature of
state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their
Constitution—a government in which the ‘three distinct departments, . . .
legislative, executive, and judicial,’ remain within the bounds of their
constitutional powers.”156 Thus, New Mexico’s judiciary has developed a
doctrine that, while limited by separation of powers concerns, provides it
with a more active role than its federal counterpart in the adjudication of
cases involving the public interest.
In State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, the New Mexico Supreme Court
granted standing to plaintiffs on the basis of the fundamental importance of
the constitutional issues involved.157 The court held that it had jurisdiction
154
In one of his well-known articles, legal scholar Louis L. Jaffe proposed a similar scheme of
judicial discretion in public actions based on the character of the issue:
We might look for our discriminant to the character of the claim asserted.
Since the moving party is a citizen, the suit may be most appropriate when he
purports to assert interests which are of peculiar citizen concern. “Citizen concern”
might be conceived of in terms of demands for the enforcement (1) of norms
generally accepted as appropriate for the proper day-to-day conduct of government,
or (2) of norms basic to the political and social process and to the citizen’s
participation in it, particularly where the political process itself does not reliably
enforce the claim.
Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1296.
155
State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 17–18 (N.M. 1995).
156
State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) (quoting N.M. CONST. art. III,
§ 1).
157
Clark, 904 P.2d at 18.
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to issue a writ of mandamus and a declaratory judgment in a case where
the plaintiffs—in their capacity as voters and taxpayers of the state—
sought, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), to preclude the
governor from implementing gaming compacts and revenue sharing
agreements entered into with Indian tribes and pueblos.158 The plaintiffs
alleged that the governor lacked the constitutional authority to commit the
state to the compacts and agreements because he was attempting to
exercise legislative authority contrary to the state constitution’s separation
of powers doctrine.159 The court concluded that the public importance
doctrine applied since the plaintiffs asserted that the governor had
exercised the state legislature’s authority, in direct violation of the
constitutionally-based separation of powers requirement.160 Highlighting
one of the underlying discretionary justifications for the public importance
doctrine, the court noted that in resolving the constitutional issues
involved, it would “contribute to this State’s definition of itself as
sovereign.”161 Clark serves as an example of a state court’s active role in
policing the boundaries within a constitutional system of government.
Similarly, in State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, the court granted standing
under the public importance doctrine to private litigants in an action for
mandamus, challenging the power of the executive branch, specifically the
Governor and Secretary of New Mexico Human Services Department, to
effect an overhaul of the state’s public assistance system without
legislative participation.162 The case involved an issue of constitutional
magnitude: whether the executive branch had exceeded its constitutional
authority in enacting and implementing welfare regulations, in violation of
the state constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.163 Thus, the court
noted that the case—rather than involving the merits of public assistance
reform—concerned the “sanctity of the New Mexico Constitution and the
judiciary’s obligation to uphold the principles therein.”164 Drawing a
comparison with Clark, the court applied the public importance doctrine in
granting standing to the plaintiffs, noting that where the government
actors’ actions implicate separation of powers considerations, and where
“[t]he balance and maintenance of governmental power is of great public
concern,” the application of such doctrine is appropriate where traditional
standing might not exist.165 This decision, as with the decision in Clark,
highlights the New Mexico judiciary’s active role in adjudicating issues of
158

Id. at 17–19.
Id. at 15.
160
Id. at 18.
161
Id.
162
State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 961 P.2d 768, 771 (N.M. 1998).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 773.
159
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constitutional import, especially where the resolution of such issues affect
a majority of citizens and where the government action at issue implicates
the separation of powers doctrine.
However, due to the activist approach that the court takes in Clark and
Taylor, these decisions could be construed as resembling advisory
opinions, an illegitimate form of judicial review in New Mexico.166 Thus,
while the public importance doctrine is theoretically sound and objective,
in practice it leaves a great deal—perhaps too much—discretion in the
hands of judges, where somewhat subjective line-drawing inevitably
occurs in distinguishing between those public actions worthy of
adjudication and those that are not. Another concern is that in deciding
whether the doctrine applies, judges must be sure to separate the issue of
standing from the merits of the case, a difficult task for any adjudicator.
Despite these concerns, the benefits of the doctrine—increasing judicial
access to those who present issues of public import, interpreting the
constitution and ensuring that such constitution is adhered to by
government actors—outweigh the potential for abuse and overreaching by
the judiciary. Moreover, despite the New Mexico judiciary’s openness
toward non-Hohfeldian litigants, it has expressed a cautious approach to
the invocation of the public importance doctrine. The New Mexico
Supreme Court, for instance, has conveyed that if a litigant’s generalized
allegation of governmental wrongdoing did not involve a clear legal duty
on the part of the government to execute the actions he or she sought to be
performed, public interest standing would not be granted.167 Thus, despite
some concerns as to its application, the case law indicates that New
Mexico has maintained a doctrine of public interest standing which
successfully limits judicial review in public actions to circumstances where
it is necessary to protect the collective rights of its citizens.
B. Ohio: Public Right Doctrine
In its “public right doctrine,” Ohio recognizes an expansive, liberal
standing definition as an alternative to its traditional injury standing
model.168 The doctrine applies where the object of a mandamus and/or
prohibition action is to procure the enforcement or protection of a public
right (as opposed to a purely private right), such as where a plaintiff asserts
that a coequal branch of government has exceeded its constitutional

166

U S W. Commc’n, Inc. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 965 P.2d 917, 920 (N.M. 1998).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) (holding that
plaintiffs—state legislators, private citizens and a non-profit corporation—did not have standing under
the public importance doctrine to challenge the legality of legislation authorizing Indian gaming in the
state).
168
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082–83 (Ohio 1999).
167
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authority.
In such a public action, it is sufficient that the litigant is an
Ohio citizen and by extension interested in the proper execution of state
laws.170 Ohio courts have applied the public action doctrine with restraint,
however, invoking it only in those “exceptional circumstances that demand
early resolution.”171
In State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, the Ohio
Supreme Court granted standing under the public right doctrine to
organizations and private citizens in a mandamus action challenging the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment amending statutes and rules
relating to tort and other civil actions.172 The court noted that in the federal
system of standing, the necessity of showing actual injury exists regardless
of whether the plaintiff seeks to enforce a private or public right.173 The
court added, however, that because Ohio state courts are not bound by
limitations upon standing imposed by the U.S. Constitution, they are “free
to dispense with the requirement for injury where the public interest so
demands.”174
When issues sought to be litigated are of great public importance or
interest, it has been the court’s long-standing practice to entertain a public
action where no rights or obligations peculiar to named plaintiffs are
involved.175 In granting plaintiffs standing, the court in Sheward
concluded that the instant case was a “public action” in that the plaintiffs
had alleged that the legislature had attempted to usurp the judiciary’s
power through its attempt at reforming the state’s tort system.176 Thus, the
citizenry’s interest in keeping the state’s judicial power in the hands of the
judiciary, where it had been constitutionally vested by the people, was
invoked.177 Moreover, the case dealt with an issue of “great public
importance,” in that it involved a challenge to the constitutionality of
legislative enactments on the grounds that such enactments directly and
169

Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1083; see also State ex rel. Meyer v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644, 649 (1883) (“[W]here
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party, and the relator need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result.”).
171
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1111 (Pfeifer, J., concurring); see also Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1314
(“[T]he public action is conceived as an action to vindicate the general public interest. Not all alleged
illegalities or irregularities are thought to be of that high order of concern.”).
172
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1084–85.
173
Id. at 1081.
174
Id.
175
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1083 (Ohio
1999). (“[T]he public action is fully conceived in Ohio as a means to vindicate the general public
interest.”) (emphasis added); State ex rel. Newell v. Brown, 122 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ohio 1954) (“Where
a public right . . . is involved, a citizen need not show any special interest therein, but he may maintain
a proper action predicated on his citizenship relation to such public right. This doctrine has been
steadily adhered to by this court over the years.”) (emphasis added).
176
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1084.
177
Id.
170
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178

broadly operated to deny the courts of judicial power.
Sheward demonstrates the active role of the Ohio court system in the
adjudication of public interest cases, especially when separation of powers
concerns are raised. However, Sheward might also be interpreted as a
power struggle between the judiciary and the legislature over the issue of
tort reform. The court may have acted more out of a fear of losing its
power than out of a desire to vindicate the public interest. Again, as with
New Mexico’s public importance doctrine, Ohio’s public right doctrine
vests a great deal of discretion with the judiciary, for better or for worse.
Additionally, it might be argued that the doctrine fails to adequately
separate the issue of standing from the merits of the case—of course, such
a distinction might be impractical in determining standing in public action
cases.
The public right doctrine was also applied in State ex rel. Newell v.
Brown, a case involving a litigant—as citizen, taxpayer, and elector—who
filed an action in prohibition seeking to prevent the Ohio Secretary of State
and the members of the county board of elections from placing the names
of certain candidates for the office of various judgeships on ballots.179 The
court asserted that “as a matter of public policy, a citizen of a community
does have such an interest in his government as to give him the capacity to
maintain a proper action to enforce the performance of a public duty
affecting himself as a citizen and citizens generally.”180 Because the
plaintiff was a citizen of the state, because the issue—the constitutionality
of the actions of public officials—was a public right of great public import,
and because the relief sought was the enforcement of a public duty by such
public officers, the court granted standing to the plaintiff to hear the merits
of the case. Although it is possible that a litigant more directly affected by
the government action, such as an opposing candidate, might have been a
more appropriate litigant, there is no indication in the opinion that such a
litigant had brought or was likely to have brought the claim. Furthermore,
because the election was to occur within a month of this decision, it
appears that the court was not, in light of “public policy,” willing to wait
for another litigant to bring the claim. Thus, this seems a prudent decision,
fitting the public right doctrine’s designation of an “exceptional
circumstance[] that demand[s] early resolution.”181

178

Id. at 1104.
Newell, 122 N.E.2d at 106. Similarly, in the context of a taxpayer action, the court held that
the plaintiff-taxpayer had standing to enforce the public’s right to the proper execution of city charter
removal provisions, regardless of any private or personal benefit he may have gained. State ex rel.
Cater v. North Olmsted, 631 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Ohio 1994).
180
Newell, 122 N.E.2d at 107.
181
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1111 (Ohio 1999)
(Pfeifer, J., concurring).
179
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V. PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN SELECT STATES: CHARACTER OF THE
LITIGANT AS BASIS FOR JUSTICIABILITY
The states discussed in Part IV illustrated the first key factor—the
character of the issue—in the determination of whether to grant or deny
standing to non-Hohfeldian litigants.182 Similarly, the states in Part V—
Utah and Alaska—focus on a number of factors in determining whether to
grant standing in public actions, including both the character of the issue
and the character of the litigant.183 These two states are highlighted here
because they aptly illustrate the second key factor—the character of the
litigant. These courts’ public interest standing doctrines address the
question of whether the plaintiff is the best litigant to proceed with a given
challenge, and if not, whether such constitutional or public issue would go
unchallenged if such plaintiff is denied standing. Moreover, the cases
focus on the capacity of the plaintiff to show some connection to the issue
and the competence with which such plaintiff can advocate on behalf of the
public.184 As with the state courts which base their standing determinations
on the character of the issue, these state courts must balance competing
interests and address separation of powers considerations, and thus their
respective doctrines are flexible and implemented on a case-by-case basis.
A. Utah: Public Interest “Alternative” Standing Test
In its public interest “alternative” standing test, Utah recognizes public
interest standing in the absence of traditional injury standing in cases
where the plaintiff is an “appropriate party” and where the issues asserted
are “of sufficient public importance to balance the absence of the
traditional standing criteria.”185
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an “appropriate party,” for
purposes of standing under the alternative test, is one that has the “interest
necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all
relevant legal and factual questions” and where the issues are not likely to
be raised if the party is denied standing.186 Moreover, there may be more
than one “appropriate party” in a given case, and thus the alternative
standing test is such that a court does not determine which party is the most
appropriate in comparison to any other, but rather, in the interests of
justice, which parties are appropriate to facilitating a full and fair
182

See infra text accompanying notes 155–81.
See infra Parts V.A, V.B.
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See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1314 (“[E]ven in states which allow public actions, the plaintiff
may be able to secure judicial intervention only if he can bring himself within the class of persons
specially entitled to sue.”).
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Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 974 (Utah 2006) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter Sierra Club I].
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187

adjudication of the dispute.
The recognition that more than one party
may be an appropriate one to litigate an issue serves the underlying
purpose of the alternative standing test—“to ensure that relevant issues are
raised by a party who can effectively address them.”188 To attend to the
potential problem of an overburdened judiciary, the alternative standing
test affords a court the discretion to require multiple parties raising similar
issues to collaborate on their briefing.189
“If the party is not an appropriate party, the court’s inquiry ends and
standing is denied.”190 However, if the “appropriate party” requirement is
met, the court then considers whether the issue is of “sufficient public
importance in and of [itself]” to warrant a grant of standing.191 This
determination requires that the court, in its discretion, regard the issue as
being of sufficient constitutional significance and that it would not be more
appropriately addressed by either the legislative or executive branch of
government through the political process.192
In Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board
(“Sevier”), the Utah Supreme Court granted the Sierra Club and other
environmental organizations standing under both the traditional and
alternative standing tests.193 The Sierra Club sought review of the Utah Air
Quality Board’s denial of its petition objecting to the Utah Division of Air
Quality’s permit authorizing the expansion of a power plant.194 The court
held that as an environmental group concerned about the expansion of the
plant, the Sierra Club was an “appropriate party” for purposes of the
alternative test because it had the requisite interest to effectively aid the
court in developing and analyzing the relevant legal and factual
questions.195 More specifically, as an entity committed to the protection of
the environment, the Sierra Club and its members were held to have had an
interest in ensuring that the development and operation of the plant comply
with all the applicable environmental laws and administrative procedures
related to the plant’s expansion in order to prevent illegal pollution or
187
See Sierra Club I, 148 P.3d at 972–73 (“[T]he notion that a court must find the most
appropriate party . . . is unnecessary and counter-productive. We think that in many cases . . . there will
be more than one party interested in the outcome of the case who can effectively raise issues that would
otherwise escape review.”) (emphasis in original).
188
Id. at 973.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 974.
191
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150.
192
Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 973 (Utah 2006) (“The
more generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the legislative or executive
branches.”).
193
Id. at 972. In a case issued concurrently with Sevier, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
Sierra Club had standing under both the traditional and alternative standing tests to challenge the
expansion of the Intermountain Power Plant. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality
Board, 148 P.3d 975, 982 (Utah 2006) [hereinafter Sierra Club II].
194
Sierra Club II, 148 P.3d at 979.
195
Sierra Club I, 148 P.3d at 974 (citing Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150).
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environmental degradation.
Underscoring the fact that under the
alternative standing test more than one litigant can be an appropriate party
in a particular case, the court held that although another litigant, Citizens’
Group—which comprised a large group of Sevier County citizens who
lived near the proposed plant site—was an appropriate party in Sevier, that
fact did not alter the Sierra Club’s status as an appropriate party; its
contribution to the litigation did not duplicate that of the Citizens’ Group
but rather presented its own distinct issues and perspective.197
Regarding the alternative standing test’s second inquiry—that is,
whether the issue was of sufficient public importance to warrant a grant of
standing—the court in Sevier held that the issue of whether the plant
proposal complied with all applicable federal and state environmental laws
was, in fact, an issue of “significant public importance.”198 Moreover,
given the plant’s propensity for emitting hazardous chemicals and its
proximity to homes and recreational areas, the court determined that the
Sierra Club’s request for compliance of federal and state law was best
addressed by the judicial branch of government since the legislative and
executive branches had already addressed such issues in passing the federal
Clean Air Act.199
Sevier offers the most comprehensible articulation by Utah’s judiciary
of its alternative public interest standing test. Because the plaintiffs were
granted standing under the traditional standing test, it appears as though the
court’s cogent discussion of the alternative test was dicta. The fact that the
court discussed at length the alternative test despite the plaintiffs having
passed muster under the traditional model shows the significance of the
alternative test in the court’s jurisprudence. The court might also have
detailed the alternative test, which has evolved over the years, so as to
address any confusion or inconsistencies regarding its application by lower
courts.
In D.A.R. v. State, the Utah Appellate Court denied standing under the
alternative test.200 The case involved a challenge by a citizen who admitted
engaging in conduct that violated the state’s sodomy and fornication
statutes—though he had never been prosecuted for such violations—
requesting a declaratory judgment that the statutes were “null and void.”201
The court held that the plaintiff failed both prongs of the alternative
standing test because he was not an appropriate party to bring the case and
the issue he raised was not of sufficient public importance to warrant a
196
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202

grant of standing.
Regarding the question of whether the plaintiff—who had not been
formally charged with any offense under the sodomy statutes—was an
appropriate party to litigate the issue of the constitutionality of such
statutes, the court noted that those individuals whom the state had actually
charged with sodomy faced a greater risk under the statutes, and therefore
had a “‘greater stake in the resolution of the issue.’”203 Thus, it was these
potential litigants, rather than the plaintiff, who could more effectively aid
the court in “developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual
questions.”204 Accordingly, the court determined that the issue was, in
fact, likely to be raised by such potential litigants even if the plaintiff was
denied standing.205
The court in D.A.R. also held that the issue raised was not of sufficient
public import to warrant a grant of standing to the plaintiff since the state
seldom enforced the sodomy and fornication statutes; in the rare instances
where the state had used the statutes, there were no intimations of a
systemic problem requiring judicial intervention.206 The court concluded
that because the alleged injury to the plaintiff was of an abstract nature, it
must be widespread among the public for the issue involved to be of
sufficient public concern to meet the demands of the alternative standing
test.207
Thus, although non-Hohfeldian litigants in public interest actions are
given a second chance at standing under Utah’s alternative standing test,
such litigants might still be denied standing if the court finds that other
litigants can better serve the public interest. The court showed restraint in
D.A.R., proving that when applied properly, Utah’s alternative standing test
adequately balances the competing interests involved in the public action
context: on one side, the vindication of the public interest and the need for
a check on government illegalities; and, on the other side, the conservation
of judicial resources and the need for a proper separation of powers
between the branches of government.
B. Alaska: Citizen-Taxpayer Standing for Issues of “Public Significance”
Through its common law, Alaska has developed an alternative
standing test in addition to its traditional injury standing test that can be
invoked in cases involving challenges made by litigants, in their capacity
202

Id. at 449–50.
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See D.A.R., 133 P.3d at 450 (stating that the court will “‘await a more appropriate
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as citizens or taxpayers, who raise issues of “public significance.”208 To
establish citizen-taxpayer standing, a plaintiff must meet two requirements:
first, the issue presented to the court must be one of “public significance,”
which Alaskan courts interpret broadly to include most constitutional
issues;209 second, the plaintiff must be an “appropriate party” to bring the
case, meaning he or she is “a true and strong adversary, even if the conduct
in question did not directly affect [him or her].”210
Signifying commonality with the test of appropriateness in Utah’s
public interest standing system,211 Alaskan courts determine whether a
plaintiff is an “appropriate party” for the sake of citizen-taxpayer standing
using three key factors: first, “the plaintiff must not be a ‘sham plaintiff’
with no true adversity of interest”;212 second, the plaintiff “must be capable
of competently advocating his or her position”;213 and third, there must not
be a plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct who has or
is likely to litigate the issue.214 Regarding the third factor—whether a
party more directly affected has or is likely to bring suit on the issue at
hand—the Alaskan Supreme Court has noted that the “mere possibility”
that such other party might bring suit does not necessitate a denial of
standing to the plaintiff in the instant case.215 Thus, a court will grant
standing to a plaintiff who can advocate his position competently and is
adequately represented even where a non-litigant party might have more at
stake in the outcome of the dispute.216
Noting that standing in Alaska is “interpreted broadly” and that the
state’s courts have “an approach favoring increased accessibility to judicial
forums,”217 the Alaska Supreme Court granted citizen-taxpayer standing to
208

Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998).
See id. (“A plaintiff who raises constitutional issues is likely to meet this requirement [of
public significance].”).
210
Id.
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See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
212
Baxley, 958 P.2d at 428. In one case applying citizen-taxpayer standing, the Alaska Supreme
Court stated that an example of a “sham plaintiff” is a party “whose intent is to lose the lawsuit and
thus create judicial precedent upholding the challenged action.” Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324,
329 (Alaska 1987).
213
Baxley, 958 P.2d at 428. This adversity requirement is similar to the requirement in Utah’s
alternative standing test that a plaintiff has “the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in
developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions.” Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,
1150 (Utah 1983). Moreover, there is no clear evidence that a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff is any less
capable than traditional plaintiffs at adequately representing a collective, public interest. In fact, these
plaintiffs may even represent such interests better than traditional plaintiffs. See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra
note 4, at 1936 (“[A] traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff, focusing on his own distinct injury, may distort
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effects.”); Segall, supra note 47, at 369 (“[I]deological, public interest plaintiffs who do not suffer
personal injury often present more concrete adverseness and better developed records than traditional
plaintiffs.”).
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215
Id. at 429.
216
Id.
217
Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209

2008]

PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN STATES

675

a coalition of environmental, Native, and fishing groups in Trustees for
Alaska v. State.218
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
challenging the state’s mineral leasing system as a violation of the Alaska
Statehood Act’s mineral leasing requirement.219 Addressing whether the
case presented an issue of public significance, the court held that public
interest in the environmental protection of mineral resources in land
selected from the federal government under the Statehood Act was of
sufficient public importance to grant standing.220 In support of the court’s
determination that the case presented an issue of public significance, it
noted that, should the plaintiffs prevail, the state would have to alter its
method of making state land available for mining, subsequently affecting
approximately 50,000 existing mining claims.221 The court also cited the
plaintiffs’ allegations that the state was illegally giving up more than
$100,000 yearly in royalties under the current system, and that the state
was at risk of forfeiting vast areas of state lands to the United States.222
The court found that the plaintiffs were appropriate parties to bring the
suit, and noted that the plaintiffs were well-represented by competent
counsel who zealously presented their position.223 The court also held that
the litigants were not “sham plaintiffs;” they clearly possessed sincerity in
their opposition to the state’s mineral disposition system. Additionally,
there were no other actual or potential litigants who might be more directly
interested in the validity of the state’s system.224 In making this
determination, the court stated that the critical issue was whether the more
directly interested potential plaintiff—the Attorney General—had sued or
seemed likely to sue in the foreseeable future, rather than simply whether
he might sue at some unknown point in the future.225 The Attorney
General had not sued, and there were no indications that he planned to, so
the court held that the plaintiffs satisfied Alaska’s test for citizen-taxpayer
standing and thus were appropriate parties to bring suit in the case.226
While a federal court might have left the issue to the political process,
the Alaskan judiciary demonstrated its active role in the vindication of the
public interest. Though the court ultimately granted citizen-taxpayer
standing, the step-by-step analysis it took exhibits its cautious approach in
these cases. This demonstrates that, as with New Mexico, Ohio, and Utah,
218

Id. at 330.
Id. at 326–27. More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the state had incorrectly interpreted
restrictions to apply only to lands known to contain minerals at the time of the state selection and had
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the judiciary in Alaska has developed a workable doctrine that provides the
courts with an active role in the adjudication of public actions without
simultaneously disrupting the balance of powers within the state
governance structure.
Similarly, in Sonneman v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court granted
citizen-taxpayer standing to a litigant who challenged the constitutionality
of a statutory amendment.227 This statutory amendment terminated the
practice of rotating the order of candidates’ names on election ballots,
replacing it with a random selection of the order of candidates’ names.228
The court first held that the constitutional issues involved—the plaintiff’s
fundamental right to vote in his capacity as a citizen of the state, and the
integrity and fairness of public elections—were of sufficient public
significance to pass muster under the first inquiry of the citizen-taxpayer
standing test.229 The court then held that the citizen was an “appropriate
party” to bring the suit. The court found that the citizen-taxpayer had
preserved his constitutional arguments on appeal; that he was a competent
advocate to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory amendment; that
the parties were truly adverse; and finally, that there was no evidence that
anyone who might be more directly affected by the statutory amendment
was in the process of challenging it.230
As with Trustees for Alaska, the court in Sonneman granted standing in
a case that might have been best left to the political process. However, the
court has also shown restraint by refusing to apply citizen-taxpayer
standing in the public action context. For example, the court denied
citizen-taxpayer standing in Ruckle v. Anchorage School District, a case in
which it refused to grant standing to a taxpayer challenging the state’s
bidding process for school bus transportation contracts.231 The denial of
standing turned on the fact that Laidlaw, the former school bus service
provider for the district which had been outbid by another bus provider,
was more directly affected by the challenged conduct and had already filed
a nearly identical suit.232 The court stated that although a plaintiff, in his or
her capacity as a citizen and taxpayer of the state, might be an appropriate
party in a public bidding case, because Laidlaw had already raised
“similar, if not identical” claims against the school district in its lawsuit,
227
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allowing Ruckle to proceed with her claims would be “unnecessarily
duplicative” and would waste judicial resources.233
Much like other state courts that utilize some permutation of a public
interest standing test, the court in Ruckle demonstrated the caution by
which Alaska’s courts grant citizen-taxpayer standing, applying a case-bycase approach and a balancing of the competing values of judicial restraint
and economy on the one side, and the need for the vindication of the public
interest on the other. By exhibiting restraint in applying public interest
standing models, state courts avoid the problems of flooding litigation and
drained judicial resources that critics often cite.234
As a result of the inherent differences between the federal and state
judicial systems, discussed in Part III, the state system is more hospitable
to public interest standing than its federal counterpart. The state public
interest models discussed in Parts IV and V demonstrate both the successes
and the challenges that arise in states that utilize doctrines which allow for
increased judicial access to non-Hohfeldian litigants. Though such
doctrines are unlikely to penetrate federal court jurisprudence, they have
proven to be effective mechanisms in the states for providing judicial
review of constitutional or statutory provisions that might otherwise be
unreviewable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of standing is an amorphous, complex, judge-made
system by which courts impose restrictions on who can access the judiciary
for the adjudication of claims and grievances of both a personal and public
nature. In the 2007 Term in Hein, the United States Supreme Court
continued its trend of limiting standing in the realm of citizen and taxpayer
suits aimed at vindicating the public interest.235 The strict, injury-based
standing model that permeates the federal courts is not adhered to by many
states, which have created their own unique systems of standing to address
issues of constitutional importance. The public interest standing doctrines
discussed demonstrate the states’ commitment to ensuring that
constitutional limitations on governmental power are judicially enforced,
while simultaneously limiting such review to public actions where it is
absolutely necessary to protect the collective rights of the citizenry. The
existence of these various state models demonstrates the difference in the
philosophy between these states’ courts and the federal courts as to the
233

Id.
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judiciary’s place in a democratic system of government and its role in the
vindication of the public interest.

